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Abstract 
Commentaries on future-oriented Chinese urban development tend to focus on showcase 
projects underway in wealthy coastal cities. This chapter instead sheds light on the way that the 
smart has been integrated into more ‘ordinary’ Chinese urban life, using the case of Wuhan, a ‘Tier 
II’ city in Central China. It explores the conditions of the emergence of Wuhan’s smart city activities 
from three perspectives. First, it outlines a series of ‘vertical’ enabling factors, whereby an 
international body of discourse and practice has been ‘translated’ into national Chinese urban 
policies. Second, it considers the simultaneous significance of ‘horizontal’ links between Wuhan’s 
local government, city governments abroad, local private enterprises, and foreign firms. Third, it 
relates Wuhan’s smart credentials to a broader process of digitalisation of everyday life in the city. 
It concludes by reflecting on the distinctive characteristics of Chinese smart urbanism, as 
exemplified by Wuhan, and finally draws out some implications for future research into smart 
cities elsewhere. Specifically, it proposes that the smart city is most usefully approached as a 
shifting and locally inflected concept which not only channels multiple policy agendas, but also 
reflects broader changes to urban space and governance in particular contexts. 
 
Final Published Version: 
Cowley, R., Caprotti, F., Ferretti, M. and Zhong, C. (2018). Ordinary Chinese Smart Cities: The 
Case of Wuhan.  In Karvonen, A., Cugurullo, F. and Caprotti, F. (eds) Inside Smart Cities: Place, 
Politics and Urban Innovation. London: Routledge, pp.45-64. ISBN: 978-0815348689. 
 
  Ordinary Chinese Smart Cities: The Case of Wuhan 
2  Accepted manuscript 
   
Introduction 
 
Although there is no shortage of international commentary on China’s more ambitious 
urban development projects and policies, researchers have paid relatively little attention 
to the growing importance of smart city ideas within these. The current chapter therefore 
aims to add to our collective understanding of ‘smart urbanism’ in the Chinese context. 
However, rather than taking its cues from global cities in the international limelight (for 
example, Shanghai), or from new digital technologies in exemplar development projects 
(for example, Tianjin Eco-City), the chapter responds to Shelton and colleagues’ (2015) 
call to investigate how the ‘actually existing smart city’ is rolling out in more ‘ordinary’ 
(Amin and Graham 1997, Robinson 2006) settings. Specifically, the case of Wuhan is used 
to illustrate the ways that the smart city concept has ‘landed’ in typical Chinese urban 
space, since the city is neither a high-profile coastal metropolis, nor a remote backwater. 
The case of Wuhan, and its national context, is potentially of empirical interest to readers 
more familiar with smart city development elsewhere; but it also has particular 
importance as one of several cities in which significant hope and resources are currently 
being invested as a model for future urban development in China. In this chapter, we 
address two research questions: What is distinctive about the Chinese smart city, as 
exemplified by Wuhan?  And what does that tell us about smart city development 
elsewhere? 
 
After providing brief contextual information about Wuhan, and sketching out its current 
smart city activities, we consider three interrelated dimensions of their recent emergence. 
First, from a ‘vertical’ perspective, they are enabled by national policies which adapt and 
frame the loose global discourse of the smart city to reflect particular Chinese agendas. 
In this sense, smart city activities on the ground may be understood as the contingent 
outcomes of policy transfer at the national level. Second, from a more ‘horizontal’, 
municipality-centric perspective, we explore the additional significance and more 
dispersed agency associated with a Chinese mode of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’. Finally, 
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we suggest that the more obvious significance of the smart for daily life is embedded 
within a much broader embrace of everyday digital technology, which extends beyond 
the ‘smart’ label itself. The chapter concludes by summarising some of the distinctive 
characteristics of Wuhan as a Chinese smart city, and reflecting on what this tells us about 
smart city development and research in different geographical contexts. 
 
The discussion draws on evidence from publicly available Chinese- and English-
language textual sources (with data triangulated where necessary across different policy 
documents, local and international news stories, academic publications, and relevant 
reports and websites), as well as on observations of everyday life, and informal 
discussions with local contacts, during two site visits in February and April 2017.  
 
Wuhan as an ‘ordinary’ Chinese city 
 
Despite its relatively low international profile in urban scholarship and the popular 
media, Wuhan is central China’s most populous city, with approximately 10 million 
residents in 2017.  Historically known as the ‘Center of the whole Empire’ (Rowe 1984, 
cited in Han and Wu 2004: 349), the city is promoted by the Wuhan Bureau of Commerce 
(2010: 2) as the logistical ‘heart of China’, and the ‘largest transportation hub for land, 
water and air travel. Its strategic location links the East with the West, and the South with 
the North’. The national State Council has formally recognized Wuhan as the most 
important shipping centre in the middle sections of the Yangtze river (van de Bovenkamp 
and Fei 2016: 2). 
 
Chinese cities are grouped into four ‘Tiers’ – a hierarchy originally established by the 
central government to manage urban development, but also now used as an informal 
classification tool.  Only a handful of cities (such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin 
and Shenzhen) are generally classified as Tier I: they have strong international profiles, 
and in many ways function as ‘showcases’ for China’s economic development on the 
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international stage. Wuhan falls into Tier II, which – depending on the calculation used – 
accounts for around 30 cities with lower gross domestic productivity and smaller 
populations (typically 3 to 15 million residents in the metro area), and which are mostly 
provincial and sub-provincial capitals. It was once comparable to Shanghai and Beijing 
in its manufacturing output and educational levels, and as recently as 1981 served as 
China’s fourth largest centre of industry. However, the focus of earlier reforms on coastal 
regions and Tier I cities led to its relative (though not absolute) economic decline (Han 
and Wu 2004, French Consulate in Wuhan 2014: 4). Today, Wuhan’s continued reliance 
on state-controlled heavy industry (Yu 2014:26) leaves its per capita income not much 
higher than the national average, and significantly lower than that of similarly sized Tier 
I cities (Euromonitor International 2017). Revenues from key steel and automotive 
industries, furthermore, are declining (The Economist 2015).  
 
Nevertheless, national development policies are increasingly being directed at Tier II 
cities because they are seen as key drivers for China’s future economic growth. The 
Wuhan city region has benefited from the national ‘Rise of Central China’ programme, 
launched in 2004 (The Economist 2015) and now in its second ten-year phase (van de 
Bovenkamp and Fei 2016: 7). Along with the ‘Go West’ policy initiative, the programme 
incentivises foreign companies to relocate from coastal regions (ibid: 16) while also 
attracting foreign banks to Wuhan (Wuhan Bureau of Commerce 2010). An often-cited 
indicator of investment in the city’s development is its ongoing expansion of the metro 
network (at the rate of one line per year) and the planned expansion of its international 
airport (The Economist 2015). Accordingly, Wuhan is one of two cities which the national 
State Council intends to upgrade to ‘national central city’ status (wh-china 2017) in 
recognition of its developmental prospects. This status was previously reserved for 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Chongqing, and Chengdu. Meanwhile, the city 
ranked 11th in Foreign Policy’s list of ‘Most Dynamic Cities of 2025’ and its GDP is 
forecasted to grow more than 400% between 2012 and 2025 (van de Bovenkamp and Fei 
2016: 16).  
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Figure 1 Ongoing construction at Optics Valley roundabout, the gateway to Wuhan’s East Lake Hi-Tech 
Development Zone (Photo: Robert Cowley) 
 
Promotional campaigns for Wuhan often emphasise the city’s educational credentials 
and its ambitions plans to diversify the local economy. Its smart city vision is at least 
discursively legitimised through the valorisation of well-educated and entrepreneurial 
‘smart people’ (Kitchin 2015) in the post-industrial, creative and hi-tech sectors. Wuhan 
is home to 120 higher education institutions (van de Bovenkamp and Fei 2016), with 
students accounting for more than one in ten of the city’s population (Wuhan Bureau of 
Commerce 2010). It has been officially ranked as China’s most important university 
cluster outside Beijing and Shanghai (French Consulate in Wuhan 2014: 4). Recent 
university rankings published by both Times Higher Education (2017) and QS (2017) place 
Wuhan University among China’s top ten higher education institutions. Active efforts to 
move Wuhan’s manufacturing base away from its dependence on heavy industry, have 
focused on Wuhan East Lake Hi-Tech Development Zone, one of Wuhan’s three ‘state-
level development zones’, where incentives are provided by central government to 
encourage investment by Chinese and foreign companies (Figure 1). Following its 
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designation by the State Council as a strategic ‘Independent Innovation Model Area’ in 
2009, the zone has attracted a wide range of hi-tech companies in opto-electronics, 
renewable energy, bio-engineering, pharmaceuticals, and agriculture (Wuhan Bureau of 
Commerce 2010, WEHDZ 2012). The national Ministry of Science and Technology ranks 
East Lake as China’s third most important hi-tech industrial zone (French Consulate in 
Wuhan 2014: 4). 
 
Our intention here is not to reproduce the optimistic tone of official policy proclamations 
and promotional documents about Wuhan, but rather simply to highlight that it is 
earmarked as having significant unfulfilled economic potential. A 2015 ‘photo essay’ in 
the Guardian newspaper (Bollen 2015) suggested that Wuhan’s appearance as a ‘typical 
second-tier Chinese city’ belies its significance in the country’s history and contrasts with 
contemporary policy ambitions to transform it into ‘a world-class cosmopolitan 
metropolis comparable to New York, Paris and Tokyo’. An only slightly less grandiose 
ambition is stated in the Plan Wuhan 2049 document, published in 2013 by the China 
Academy of Urban Planning and Design, for the city to become a world-ranking 
metropolis comparable to Rome, Chicago, or Munich (French Consulate in Wuhan 2014). 
Rhetoric aside, the future success of Wuhan is intended to be a ‘blueprint’ for other 
second-tier cities (Euromonitor International 2017).  Thus, Wuhan is an ‘ordinary’ 
Chinese city but also serves as an indicator of planned future development at a national 
level. It provides intriguing insights on how the actually existing smart city is emerging 
in China. 
 
Overview of Smart City Activity in Wuhan 
 
There is convincing evidence that Wuhan has actively embraced the use of smart 
technology across a wide range of areas of urban life, even though implementation is at 
a pilot stage in many cases. In this respect, the city is a relative pioneer. As long ago as 
2010, its Municipal Science & Technology Bureau announced the intention to invest 10 
million yuan (€1.3m) in smart city projects. China Aerospace & Industry Corporation was 
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chosen to draw up the plans, which were approved in 2012 (Fan et al. 2016). 
Implementation has been coordinated by the Wuhan Research Institute for Smarter Cities 
(WRISC), established in 2012 by Wuhan Information Industry Office (a government 
agency) and the city’s Land Resources and Planning Bureau, with a remit to distribute 
funding, provide consultancy, and assist in the development of industrial parks (WRISC 
undated). In 2016, 30 demonstrator projects had been implemented under this smart city 
pilot umbrella (Changjiang Daily News 2016).  
 
Many of the pilot projects are described on WRISC’s website. They include various 
industrial applications, including the distribution of pharmaceuticals, the management 
of agricultural production, and a platform allowing producers to sell food boxes directly 
to households. A new barcode system provides information on the methods used to grow 
fresh food and its provenance (Chien 2017), and RFID chips track meat production from 
slaughterhouse to point of sale.   
 
The projects also address traditional and digital infrastructure. An integrated real-time 
data system for sewage management has been trialled. Meanwhile, electronic toll 
collection was introduced to some of the city’s bridges and tunnels and will contribute to 
a wider roll-out of a smart parking scheme, with possible further uses of the collected 
mobility data being explored. WiFi is being extended on the bus network to enable real-
time service information. Investment into the city’s cloud-based GIS information 
platform has facilitated administrative decision-making and supported the development 
of smartphone apps. Integrated online administrative public services were introduced 
alongside a platform for residents to report problems and register complaints. 
Meanwhile, video cameras across the city feed into a centralised traffic information 
system and a surveillance system connected to all the city’s police stations, to improve 
public safety. The local government has introduced a free public WiFi network with over 
1,000 hotspots and significantly expanded the city’s fibreoptic broadband coverage. Plans 
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are underway to digitally monitor the safety of construction sites and passenger lifts, and 
to roll out smart traffic management more widely (Changjiang Daily News 2016). 
 
Other activities are more oriented towards social needs and public education. A ‘smart 
campus’ demonstrator project sends alerts to parents’ phones to confirm children’s 
arrival at school and facilitates communication with teachers (Chien 2017).  The ‘Smart 
Television Bookstore’ project allows people to read books, magazines and newspapers 
through their televisions. Information about historical architecture is provided via QR 
codes displayed on buildings. Online services have been developed to support the elderly, 
including telemedicine and home care, and to facilitate food delivery, domestic 
maintenance, and emergency services. The local government has been particularly keen 
to develop its ‘Smart Health’ information programme. Medical records are available from 
a specially constructed cloud platform (Fan et al. 2016) and smart wristbands are being 
used in hospitals to collate individual medical files for patients from different 
departments (Chien 2017).   
 
Taken as a whole, then, these officially sanctioned smart city activities display the 
potential to have tangible impacts on a broad variety of aspects of everyday life. One 
important reason for their emergence, as discussed in the next section, is the role of 
policy-making ‘from above’.  
 
Vertical enabling factors 
 
To understand how the smart city is being manifested on the ground in different 
locations, it is useful to draw on contemporary debates regarding international ‘policy 
transfer’.  While political scientists have long been interested in the factors enabling or 
hindering the implementation of ideas and initiatives imported from different contexts, 
the notion of ‘fast policy transfer’ (Peck & Theodore 2001; 2010; Peck 2011) describes the 
tendency for ideas across diverse fields of governance to circulate more rapidly and 
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extensively than was previously the case, as a result of contemporary processes of 
globalisation. Relatedly, examples of ‘best practice’ in urban development are widely 
emulated in different cities around the world: the tendency for contemporary urban 
sustainability projects, for example, to draw on the expertise of international firms of 
consultants and masterplanners (Joss et al. 2013, Rapoport 2015, Rapoport and Hult 2017) 
means that the same ideas and designs are often replicated in a wide range of contexts. 
Yet this process does not necessarily have homogenising effects on urban landscapes 
around the world. As Rapoport (2015) observes, ideas are frequently modified for local 
use, and what gets built may sometimes diverge radically from the masterplan or design. 
Accordingly, we follow Stone (2017) in conceptualising contemporary policy transfers as 
processes of hybridisation, whereby ideas from elsewhere inevitably get ‘translated’ into 
local contexts, rather than straightforwardly imposed in linear fashion. The recent spread 
of ‘smart city’ ideas into national policy-making invites more detailed exploration of how 
these are variously transformed as they become enrolled into pre-existing policy agendas, 
and, in turn, of their roles in constraining and enabling what actually emerges at the local 
level. This approach departs from critiques of the smart city concept which variously 
highlight its technocratic characteristics as a potentially problematic one-size-fits-all 
imposition onto urban space (see, for example, Halpern et al. 2013, Söderström et al. 2014, 
Vanolo 2014). 
 
Our discussion of Wuhan’s smart city activities begins by interpreting them through the 
lens of national policy, as a particular ‘translation’ of a global policy discourse. The case 
for considering the influential effects of national policy on urban development may seem 
self-evident – and yet its role is often underemphasised or overlooked in discussions of 
city-specific initiatives (Joss and Cowley 2017) that are not ‘top-down’ flagship projects, 
such as Masdar City in the United Arab Emirates (Cugurullo 2016). As discussed below, 
Chinese smart city development is not solely determined by the national government, 
but is nevertheless more clearly driven from the centre than is typically the case in, for 
example, European cities.   
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Wuhan’s smart city funding announcement in 2010 (mentioned earlier) directly resulted 
from the national Ministry of Science and Technology’s selection of Wuhan as a pilot 
location in the China-wide ‘863 Smart Cities’ programme (High-Tech Development & 
Industrialization Office 2012). More recently, a wider enabling national policy landscape 
has emerged. Significantly, the new National Urbanisation Plan (2014-2020), which aims 
primarily to ‘convert the rural population into urban residents in an orderly manner’ 
(China.org.cn 2014), also envisions a series of specific ‘directions’ to ‘drive forward the 
building of smart cities’ (CAICT/EU-China PDSF 2016: ix). These include proposed 
improvements to broadband networks, the digitalisation of urban planning and 
management, smart infrastructure, and more convenient public services (Tan-Mullins et 
al. 2017). A report by the China Academy of Information and Communications 
(CAICT/EU-China PDSF 2016: 41–45), lists a raft of recent national policies directly 
relevant to smart city development.  These include: 
 
• Two strategic documents issued by the State Council in 2012 (primarily aimed at 
improving and integrating data use across different urban public services); and in 
2013 (encouraging municipalities to develop demonstrator projects in 
collaboration with the private sector); 
• Three 5-year plans issued by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
(MIIT) in 2011, relating to information security, e-commerce, and the Internet of 
Things (the latter encouraging smart city demonstrator projects across fields 
including logistics, transport, security, and medical care); 
• A Special Action Plan issued by MIIT to encourage wider use of digital information 
across different industrial sectors, covering the period 2013-2018;  
• A call by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) in 
2012 for cities to apply to a national pilot smart cities scheme, relating to fields 
including security, construction, municipal administration, and industry;  
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• A strategic agreement made between the Chinese Society for Urban Studies and 
China Development Bank (CDB), whereby CDB will finance smart city 
development following the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan; 
• Proposals made by the National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and 
Geoinformation in 2012 (to enhance digital mapping support for smart city 
development), and 2013 (to link local databases and geographical information to 
cloud platforms); and 
• A cross-Ministry strategic document, released in 2014 (Tan-Mullins et al. 2017), on 
Promoting the Healthy Development of Smart Cities, aiming to provide clear 
guidelines for the smart city as a new model of sustainable urban development, 
and to introduce more convenient, efficient and environmentally friendly public 
services, with 100 pilot cities to be selected. 
 
It is difficult to place a precise figure on the resulting number of smart city projects 
currently taking place in China.  Some sources report small numbers and suggest that 
Wuhan is one of ten cities chosen to participate in a national programme of pilot smart 
schemes to promote low carbon development (Min et al. 2015). Elsewhere, it is reported 
that several hundred smart city initiatives were launched across the country between 
2013 and 2015 (Tan-Mullins et al. 2017, CAICT/EU-China PDSF 2016). This variation 
mirrors the challenges in quantifying ‘eco-city’ schemes in China (Joss 2015), for which 
estimates range from ‘more than 100’ (Wu 2012) to ‘more than 1,000’ (Ren 2013: 112), 
depending on the sources and the definition used. For both smart and eco city projects, 
this variation and imprecision reflects a broader symptom of ‘fragmented 
authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). As Tan-Mullins and colleagues (2017: 
3) note, ‘different central government Ministries may stipulate various related but 
different…policies, creating greater political space for sub-national local governments to 
apply or compete. This is one important reason why most Chinese cities have more than 
one type of smart and eco project’. 
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Conversely, the last document in the above list suggests that a process of 
‘standardisation’ is underway at the national level. Again, however, this is only part of 
the story: while a shift towards standardisation may be interpreted as an attempt to 
strengthen the role of central government, there is a parallel emphasis on the private 
sector to deliver smart cities. While local governments have played a dominant role in 
procuring smart technology in China, it is expected that their role in future will be 
increasingly restricted to regulatory oversight, with wider roll-out of public-private 
partnership arrangements (Li et al. 2015). A more complete picture of the smart city 
agenda in Wuhan is revealed by accounting for the distinct roles of local actors. In the 
next section, we consider Wuhan’s smart city development through the lens of ‘urban 
entrepreneurialism’. 
 
Horizontal enabling factors 
 
In their review of the early literature around the shift towards ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ 
in Western cities, Hall and Hubbard (1996) picked out a series of defining characteristics. 
These include a shift from primary concern with providing local welfare and services, to 
a more outward-looking focus on economic development; the use of ‘place marketing’ as 
part of wider conscious attempts to attract inward investment, underpinned by an 
understanding of the ongoing globalisation of production, and consequently the more 
pressing need to compete with other cities internationally; and the growing use of 
temporary multi-sectoral partnerships and coalitions in the service of ‘piecemeal’ urban 
development based on speculative projects. Wu (2003: 1675) distinguishes contemporary 
and more active ‘attempts to pursue entrepreneurial advantages’ from the ‘conventional 
city which is merely a location where entrepreneurial activities occur’. Wu mobilises 
Jessop and Sum’s (2000) model of the definitive characteristics of the entrepreneurial city 
that include the use of entrepreneurial strategies within a recognisable entrepreneurial 
discourse to promote particular entrepreneurial images of the city. 
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There are various problems with applying the idea of urban entrepreneurialism to 
Chinese cities. Perhaps most obviously, such tendencies in ‘post-socialist’ cities (Wu 2003) 
address neither a ‘post-Fordist’ crisis (Jessop 1994) nor the perceived failure of the social-
democratic Keynesian welfare state (Jessop 1999). But neither can direct parallels be made 
with Eastern European ‘post-socialist’ economies, which were already significantly more 
industrialised and urbanised than China before 1979 (Wu et al. 2016). In China, market 
reforms are not related to a ‘roll-back’ (Peck and Tickell 2002) of the state, but rather are 
intended to support the centrally planned economy and consolidate state power (de 
Rambures 2015). Although Chinese municipal entrepreneurialism is encouraged by the 
ongoing process of market reforms, it is also constrained by a prioritised requirement for 
‘social stability’ (Yu and Zhu 2009: 217). China differs from the West, furthermore, in its 
national government’s financial and political ability to impose ‘megaprojects’ with 
significant consequences for individual cities, its lack of strong horizontal networks of 
associations between local governments, and limited institutionalised coordination of 
large projects across city-regions (Ren 2013: 76).  
 
Nevertheless, certain surface features of contemporary Chinese urban governance are at 
least analogous with those of Western urban entrepreneurialism (Yu and Zhu 2009: 202), 
if only because particular aspects of ‘marketisation’ have been borrowed from the 
Western experience (Wu 2003: 1674). Below the surface, furthermore, Yu and Zhu (2009) 
argue against the assumption that local ‘entrepreneurialism’ in China describes a 
straightforward implementation of policy directions imposed by central government. 
Rather, both local government and local enterprises have significant agency (and may be 
the key factors) in shaping its precise forms (ibid.). Certain cities, such as Shanghai (Wu 
2003), clearly display entrepreneurial strategising and agency which, in line with Jessop 
and Sum’s (2000) model, extend beyond the presence of activities ‘simply resulting from 
market-oriented reform’ (Wu 2003: 1675). 
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At least in the superficial sense, Wuhan displays clear evidence of urban 
entrepreneurialism. It has developed a ‘brand logo’ for its place-marketing agenda 
(Figure 2) that is prominently displayed on billboards all over the city and in promotional 
materials. The inclusion of an English-language strapline suggests the outward 
orientation of the message; and its wording (‘Wuhan, Different Every Day!’) consciously 
taps into entrepreneurial discourses around flexibility and the ability to manage 
continual change (Yu and Zhu 2009) while also promoting the city as an interesting 
destination for visitors and businesses. 
 
 
Figure 2 Place marketing on billboards in Wuhan (Photo: Haiyu Zhang) 
 
Wuhan’s ongoing growth and increasing importance within national policy-making has 
attracted the interest of the outside world, and the active role played by foreign interests 
further disrupts a model of hierarchical national planning emanating from Beijing. Its 
most well-established ties are with France, which reopened its consulate in the city in 
1998. Three other countries now have consulates in Wuhan: South Korea (established in 
2010), the US (2008), and the UK (2015); Russia is also considering opening a consulate in 
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the near future. While the Netherlands opened a trade office in Wuhan as early as 1996, 
several other countries have followed suit since 2010, including Singapore, Japan, Canada 
and Australia.  The development of smart city activities in Wuhan, then, has paralleled a 
wider opening up of direct links with the outside world, and the growing number of 
foreign residents in the region is a source of pride for the city (see for example Hubei 
Government undated).  
 
The connections with France have had the most tangible impact on Wuhan’s spatial 
development, including a strong French industrial presence (French Consulate in Wuhan 
2014; UbiFrance – SE de Wuhan 2014), and the planned 30-square-kilometre ‘Sino-French 
Ecological Demonstration City’ in the Caidan district to the west of the city (Chien 2017). 
However, Wuhan’s smart city agenda is directly influenced by a longstanding and active 
‘twin city’ arrangement with Manchester (Jayne et al. 2013) – one of 22 twinning 
arrangements established since 1979 (CIFCA undated). The planned Qingshan Riverside 
business development explicitly aims to learn from ‘Manchester’s very own flagship 
smart city area – ‘Corridor Manchester’’, and one of the Memorandums of Understanding 
signed to coincide with the opening of the British Consulate in 2015 intended to ‘boost 
co-operation and exchange between the two cities to identify smart city solutions. The 
cities will work together to highlight the challenges each city faces in tackling smart city 
issues and find ways the cities and their companies can collaborate’ (UK Government 
2015). 
 
Wuhan’s 2010 smart city funding announcement and competition indicate how the 
actions of the local authorities are extending beyond procedures laid down by Beijing: 
Fan and colleagues (2016: 2) observe that, while the design and planning processes were 
‘typical’ for China, the ‘open and global project bidding’ process was ground-breaking in 
the Chinese context. Equally, it would be limiting to interpret the prominent Wuhan 
Smart Health initiative (mentioned above) as an example of a local government enacting 
strategic directions set from above. This enacts a longstanding national government 
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interest in using new technologies to reduce health inequalities and improve services 
(Zheng and Rodríguez-Monroy 2015). However, its implementation has depended on the 
synergetic agency of ‘hundreds’ of local private companies (Fan et al. 2016: 62), suggesting 
a networked and dispersed mode of governance rather than a ‘firm-handed’ command-
and-control approach. 
 
Many of the local private companies are based in Wuhan’s ‘Optics Valley’, mentioned 
above. This development zone, dubbed the city’s ‘Silicon Valley’, is also home to IBM, 
which first established a branch in Wuhan in 1996 (IBM undated), and has collaborated 
closely with the Wuhan government at the ‘platform’ level to develop cloud computing 
to enable smart technology (Hao et al. 2012). The Wuhan East Lake High-tech 
Development Zone reaches out horizontally in its active appeals to foreign investors ‘as 
the only approved ‘future science and technology town’ in central and western regions’ 
(WEHDZ 2012). 
 
It is possible, then, to narrate the emergence of smart city initiatives in Wuhan as the 
result of policies and incentives introduced by Beijing, in reflection of a body of global 
discourse, but translated into and constrained by a particular set of national development 
agendas.  To do so, however, misses the equally important influence of, and more 
dispersed agency implied by, dynamic entrepreneurial connections among Wuhan’s 
local government, city governments abroad, local private enterprises, and foreign firms. 
 
Wuhan as ‘everyday’ smart city 
 
The fact that our story so far might reasonably have been told based only on secondary 
sources raises various methodological questions in relation to the smart city. In particular, 
there is a risk that investigations based solely on published documents will produce 
distorted pictures. The researcher discovers a variety of official documents, nested at 
different scales of governance, and designed to present achievements and plans in the 
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best possible light.  Glossy promotional websites and brochures illustrate activities 
ranging from city-wide infrastructural upgrades, radical improvements to services, and 
newly-built whole districts of a city, through to small-scale experiments in digitalisation, 
and one-off educational schemes.  And one might surmise that the smart city is not only 
a centrally important global policy phenomenon, but also has a significant impact on the 
daily lives of the city’s residents. On arriving in the city, however, the expectation of 
finding – for better or worse – a glistening, digitalised, ultra-efficient metropolis of the 
future remains unfulfilled.  Instead, it is difficult to find visible or tangible evidence of 
the ‘smart’. The championed flagship initiatives are relatively insignificant within the 
space of the city of the whole and go largely unnoticed by local residents. Certain widely-
touted and innovative sounding urban improvements in fact predate their packaging as 
smart, and other schemes never go beyond their planning stages. In our collective 
research experience of investigating related policies and practices internationally, even 
policy-makers themselves are sometimes only vaguely aware of their city’s smart 
ambition when interviewed, while other key actors view it primarily as a passing fad 
mobilised instrumentally to attract funding. 
 
Such disappointment need not mean that the smart city is only chimerical. Reflecting on 
a visit to Wuhan, a participant in a delegation from Manchester City Council concluded 
that ‘Smart cities should be felt, not seen’ (Oliviera 2015). By this, he meant that the smart 
city is not revealed by the visible presence of particular innovative technologies and 
processes on display. Rather, a ‘Smart City is one where all the technology is for the most 
part hidden from view, working in the background, sensing, listening, reacting and 
predicting’ (ibid.). This conclusion has similarities with Weiser’s (1991) influential 
predictions around the project of ubiquitous computing. Here, the smart city feeds into 
long-standing ambitions to ‘enhance the world already in existence by making 
computing an invisible force that runs through the background of everyday life’ (Gabrys 
2016: 6). An alternative search for the everyday smart city leads us to those digital 
technologies whose use has become normalised in, and which co-constitute, daily life, 
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and are already ‘embedded into the fabric of cities’ (Kitchin 2016: 24). The big picture may 
elude us if definitional work focuses only on the content of smart city policy documents 
and visions, or on cataloguing particular ‘smart’ activities rendered visible through 
institutional ratification. This is not to deny the importance of the ‘official’ smart city but 
to position it as a reflection, or at best a catalyst, of the more invasive and invisible 
digitisation of everyday life. 
 
No attempt is made here to provide a detailed survey of the take-up of digital 
technologies in Wuhan, or to compare this systematically with cities elsewhere. 
Impressionistically, however, certain differences are immediately apparent when 
comparing Wuhan to Western cities. The visitor is struck by the widespread use of mobile 
payment services, provided through services such as Alipay, WeChat Pay, and Baidu. 
This is in stark contract with European or North American cities, where mobile payments 
are a nascent activity. Services such as Alipay allow for rapid transfer of funds, via ‘QR’ 
codes, which are commonplace in shops, restaurants and elsewhere. The Economist (2017) 
reports that mobile payments in China as a whole are now ‘more than 50 times the size 
of the American market’. Similarly, one is struck by the prevalence and variety of bike-
sharing schemes in operation (Figure 3). Innovative Chinese approaches to such 
technology, relying on QR codes and GPS technology, have recently made international 
headlines – notably including the rise of ‘Mobike’, which has recently extended its 
operations to Manchester. 
 
While the smart city is not coterminous with the internet, the infrastructure of the latter 
clearly has an important enabling role. Internet connection speeds in Wuhan are slow by 
Western standards but the city is a leader in overall internet usage relative to its urban 
peers. The city has the fourth highest level of internet use among all Chinese cities (Wei 
2016) and the 2016 China Internet + Index ranks Wuhan as one of the top ten cities in China 
(Chien 2017: 58). It is arguably through smartphone technology that the ‘real’ smart city 
is evolving most significantly in everyday China.  Data from the China Internet Network  
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Figure 3 One of Wuhan’s many bike-sharing schemes, enabled by QR codes, smartphones and GPS 
technology (Photo: Haiyu Zhang) 
 
Information Center showed that 90% of Chinese internet users (who account for just over 
half of the population) access it via smartphones (Wall Street Journal 2016). The South 
China Morning Post estimates smartphone usage in China at 62%, compared with an 
average of 55% in European countries (Perez 2015). More recent survey data (Poushter 
2017) suggests that 68% of Chinese adults now own a smartphone, rising as high as 94% 
among 18- to 34-year-olds, and marginally higher in urban than rural areas. This 
compares with only 18% for India, a ‘developing’ country of similar size. In Wuhan 
specifically, based on our own observations of everyday life, smartphone use is at least 
as visible as in most European cities, and is certainly not the exclusive domain of the 
young and affluent. 
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This suggests that there are different ‘spheres of action’ in Chinese (and broader) smart 
urbanism. The spheres of international and national policy discourse, and the municipal 
strategy sphere, are clearly not recognisable at the level of the urban resident. More 
accurately, the impact of today’s policies and strategies is likely to be visible, and felt, 
only when concrete is poured, digital fibre is laid, and ways of governing and organising 
the city change. Nonetheless, it is clear from our research in Wuhan that the smart city 
exists at the level of the street, and of the individual citizen. At this level, the smart city is 
accessed and rendered visible through interfaces such as the smartphone, and is 
experientially felt and performed through technologies and practices such as shared bike 
schemes, mobile payment services, and smart transport solutions. This underlines the 
point that studies of the smart city can usefully move from the more static world of policy 
documents and glossy reports (Kitchin 2015) to the messy and at times more playful 
performance of smart urbanism as lived practice. 
 
Conclusions: The Ordinary Chinese Smart City  
 
Whether we trace the implementation of smart city technology in Wuhan back to national 
policy drives, see it as more directly catalysed by local multi-sectoral actors, or speculate 
on the way it dovetails comfortably with a broader embrace of digital technology, the 
smart agenda is revealed as less of a discrete phenomenon, and more of a repackaging or 
rechannelling of the broader currents of urban development. With this in mind, we return 
to our original questions: what is distinctive about the Chinese smart city, as exemplified 
by Wuhan?  And what does that tell us about smart city development elsewhere? 
 
The search for distinctiveness is difficult at first, since none of the specific technologies 
and aspirations embodied within official local smart schemes are unique to Wuhan. In 
using digital technology, for example, to improve the efficiency of public services and 
infrastructure, update the administration of healthcare, or rationalise the allocation of 
parking spaces, Wuhan’s activities mirror those of any number of cities around the world. 
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Importing technological solutions in this way need not imply a naivety about their social 
implications. Rather, Chinese authorities have traditionally professed adherence to the 
adage of ‘Western technology, Chinese wisdom’ (de Rambures 2015: 11). But what 
characterises these smart activities, taken as a whole, is that they conjure up a rather 
passive sense of the public. The focus on efficiency is not accompanied by parallel 
attempts to encourage digital participation in decision-making, co-create the smart city, 
or address a public sphere beyond those dimensions of urban life which are 
institutionally sanctioned or associated with consumer activity. To adapt a model of 
smart city ‘publicness’ recently developed in relation to the UK (Cowley et al. 2017), smart 
city activities in Wuhan are oriented towards a public envisioned as a collectivity of 
service users, rather than designed to appeal to the more creative, political or civic 
dimensions of its residents’ lives.   
 
This outcome is not unique to China. It might be predicted, however, by the particular 
combination of broader agendas into which enabling smart city policies are subsumed, 
namely supporting economic development, improving the efficiency of public services, 
managing urban growth, and supporting social stability. Since the national government 
does appear to have a significant role in the emergence of local smart city activities, it is 
likely to continue influencing future developments. This is unlikely to be in the direction 
of democratising cities, nor guided by a broad ‘neoliberalising’ belief in the efficacy of 
markets at the expense of ‘big government’ – but rather by the desire to strengthen the 
state further. 
 
Relatedly, we see significance in the fact that Chinese smart city development is 
advocated within national planning documents (CAICT/EU-China PDSF 2016). Even 
though this chapter has specifically argued that the Chinese smart city goes beyond 
national policy directives, its mobilisation as a national planning concept suggests a more 
centralised mode of development than in Europe. In the UK, for example, national policy-
makers appear to view smart technology primarily in terms of its potential for exports; 
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local authorities are not required to include smart ambitions in their strategic plans. In 
the Netherlands, similarly, the smart city is unfolding through very networked 
governance at local level, but suffers from a lack of national coordination (Sengers 2016: 
3).   
 
The Chinese approach also diverges from the Indian programme of smart cities: it is being 
pushed forwards on multiple policy fronts, rather than through a single policy drive. The 
simultaneous mobilisation of various smart city concepts by different national 
government agencies appears to be a characteristic example of Chinese ‘institutional 
bricolage’, whereby ideas and practices from elsewhere in the world are borrowed 
selectively and ‘reassembled onto existing institutional frameworks’ (de Jong 2013: 89). 
This, in turn, may be an outcome of the fragmented approach to national policy-making 
(Chien 2017), which not only suggests agentive space for local authorities to ‘pick and 
choose’ to some extent, but also reflects smart city development elsewhere. One 
methodological implication, especially in cross-comparative work, is that approaching 
the smart city as a body of practices resulting from policy discourse should not involve 
expectations of linearity between particular policies and outcomes.  Rather, the flexibility 
of the concept allows it to derive legitimacy from multiple agendas – and, consequently, 
attempts to delineate and define its contents at different scales, are likely to be frustrated. 
Instead, while it is fruitful to trace the various policy influences, the local smart city is 
best understood as a rather open-ended idea which channels these broader agendas in 
shifting place-specific ways. 
 
The last point may appear to privilege the ‘vertical’ effects of smart city discourse on 
particular places. But we have proposed that this should go hand in hand with analysis 
of the horizontal agency exerted by local actors and institutions, as well as a more open-
ended reading of its everyday lived experiences and materiality. This broad, three-way 
framework for analysing and comparing smart city activity internationally is currently 
being developed further within a wider research project looking at a variety of European 
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and Chinese cities (for a preliminary discussion, see Sengers et al. 2017). This resonates 
with the call by Hodson and colleagues (2017) to approach socio-technical urban 
sustainability transitions as varied ‘reconfigurations’ of loose bodies of ideas and 
practices, which are constituted simultaneously by discourse, particular forms of 
governance, and technical innovations. 
 
Such an approach, in the case of Wuhan, positions the ordinary, ‘actually existing’ smart 
city as neither an object of study which can be definitively pinned down to a particular 
set of innovations, nor merely an empty policy signifier.  More satisfactorily, it may be 
approached as a locally inflected symptom of a broader set of changes to urban space and 
governance, and it is these, rather than their superficial and more readily visible 
manifestations labelled as ‘smart’, which should be the focus for future investigations.  
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